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1. Introduction 
Over the last thirty years centrally planned 
economies, also known as Soviet-type or socialist or as 
instances of realised socialism, have often undertaken and 
to some extent implemented reform projects for the 
progressive expansion of the scope of markets at the expense 
of direct central allocation. From Yugoslavia to China, 
from Hungary to Poland and the Soviet Union, none of these 
economies with the possible exception of Albania has escaped 
this process; the very frequency of reform attempts 
indicates both the necessity and difficulty of changing the 
principles of operation of socialist planning, rather than 
simply introducing marginal improvements. Reform projects 
have included varying degrees of enterprise decisional 
autonomy, contractual relations instead of central 
allocation of materials and foreign exchange, direct access 
to foreign trade, workers' self-management, reprivatisation. 
Economic reform has implied also, sooner or later 
everywhere, a certain remonetisation of the socialist 
economy. This paper reviews monetary reform, its latest 
developments and its systemic limits (sections 2-4) then 
considers the following questions. Take an imaginary closed 
economy where socialist central planning has been 
successfully reformed and converted to market socialism, but 
where the system's economic or ideological premises still 
preclude financial institutions such as private ownership of 
voting equity shares or a full-fledged stock e.xcl1ange. Are 
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there important functions, in such an economy, that might 
have been performed by the missing financial institutions 
(section 5)? Could these functions be performed by ot,her 
permitted financial and other institutions already existing 
(section 6)? What kind of financial innovation might 
replace or simulate the functioning of the missing 
institutions? I will argue that the customary restrictions 
do not affect the possibility but hinder the efficiency of 
financial intermediation, and ·that secondary equity markets 
potentially perform functions which would be of great 
importance also under marl:o:et socialism; that, nevertheless, 
market socialism could, in principle, replicate or simulate 
those functions without relaxing systemic restrictions. A 
three-stage proposal is put forward for financial innovation 
which ought to replace the missing institutions (sections 7-
9); here financial innovation is understood no~ on~y i~ the 
general sense of new markets, instrumen~s a~d 1~st1tut1on~, 
but also in the technical sense in wh1ch 1t lS used 1n 
current debates on capitalist financial developments, i.e. 
of "banks' dis-intermediation" and of the economy's 
"securitisation". Section 10 summarises the arguments for 
and against the proposal. 
It should be stressed 
intellectual speculation about 
that this is a purely 
the feasibility of 
a firm statement about 
model, however, can be 
and settles one way or 
potentially useful institutions, not 
desirable change; no market socialist 
deemed complete unless it considers 
the other the questions raised by the · missing financial 
institutio;ns. 
2. Reform and remonetisation 
A moneyless socialist economy, outside a distant 
full communism, was rarely suggested or practiced; Neurath's 
Naturalwirtschaft (1919), Soviet War Communism (1918-21) at 
its peak or Cambodia in the early 1970s were exceptions. 
Lenin had understood the importance of banks as an 
administrative structure; his intuition and the necessary 
implications of central planning are reflected in the role 
of money in the traditional socialist model, which took 
shape in the USSR at the turn of the 1930s and was fully 
imitated in the other Eastern European countries (see Garvy, 
1966). In the traditional centrally planned model money is 
primarily an accounting instrument of agg::-egation and 
control· financial flows are compartamental1sed between 
enterprises and households, with a bank money circuit for 
inter-enterprises transactions and cash for transactions 
involving households as buyers or sellers. These financial 
flows are adjusted passively to planned physical flows and 
to the degree of their implementation by a single bank 
monopolising the functions of commercial as well as central 
banking (therefore dubbed "Monobank"). Households are f,ree 
to convert cash into available consumption goods, a small 
range of durables including some production goods, or save 
it as cash or a limited range of financial instruments 
(deposits, bonds, insurance, lottery tickets etc); the 
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balance of revenues and expenditures of the population is 
closely monitored and ideally balanced ex ante through price 
and incomes policy; it forms the basis of cash issues. 
Enterprises can only use finance for purposes specified in 
plan documents; in this sense Berliner (1976) talks of 
"documonetary" economy. Investment is centrally decided and 
allocated in real terms while finance is provided 
automatically and interest-free from the state budget to 
investors, who are subject to straight line amortisation 
charges on the historical cost of their investments and 
transfer back to the state budget any surplus which they may 
realise (or rely on further transfers from the budget to 
cover their planned losses). Credit is mostly short term 
and is also automatically available to enterprises to 
finance their working capital requirements necessary to 
fulfill their planned tasks; it is granted by the Central 
Bank at an almost symbolic interest rate designed to cover 
banks' administrative costs. Trade credit between 
enterprises is forbidden. Thus money in the traditional 
system is unit of account, two-tier medium of exchange 
conditionally to plan conformity, store of value in 
competition with inventories of goods rather than with 
alternative financial or productive assets. It is an 
instrument for monitoring and controlling plan 
implementation (control by the rouble), not an instrument 
for economic management, except when planners lose control 
over financial balances, in which c3se monetary policy can 
be an important instrument for restoring that balance. 
In the reformed socialist model (which still is 
not fulli realised in any actual socialist economy) money 
recovers an important role (see Brus, 1964; for a pioneering 
detection and analysis of the early stages of this process 
in the 1960s see Grossman, 1968). Financial flows become 
fully connected, commercial banking is separated from 
central banking (as it was done in Britain with Sir Robert 
Peel's Act of 1844, which abandoned the principles of the 
banking school in favour of those of the currency school) 
and exercised by competing banks (as it had been the case 
already in the USSR in the early stages of NEP; see Arnold, 
1937, Carr and Davies, 1969); investment grants are replaced 
by bank credits, inter-enterprise loans and self-finance; 
credit is provided not automatically but at the discretion 
of banks on a contractual basis and at an interest which is 
supposed to balance the market; enterprises which are not 
deemed creditworthy can be forced into liquidation and 
bankruptcy; there is a wide range of financial instruments 
available to households and enterprises. Money becomes an 
unconditional and therefore more liquid means of payment, 
and a less attractive store of value because of a wider 
range of alternatives. The way is paved for active monetary 
policy, using standard instruments such as reserve and 
liquidity ratios, rediscounting scale and rates, open market 
operations, etcetera. 
features 
neglected 
The role of financial markets and their possible 
in a socialist system have been conspicuously 
both in the classical literature on market 
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socialism and in the blueprints for economic reform in 
Eastern Europe. Pareto (1902, 1903) stressed the immanence 
of economic categories such as capital and interest 
regardless of economic system (Vol. I, eh. 6; a point made 
also by Bohm-Bawerk, 1909, Vol. I); criticised socialist 
thinkers for confusing the capitalist and the entrepreneur 
(Vol. II, Ch. 10) and Proudhon's monetary and banking scheme 
(Vol. II, Ch. 11) which, providing money automatically for 
productive undertakings at virtually no interest, closely 
resembles the monetary system of a traditional centrally 
planned economy. Barone ( 1908) expected the l1inister of 
Production of his Collectivistic State to finance investment 
exclusively through loans at an equilibrium interest rate 
that matched the marginal return on investment. None of the 
proponents of Marktsozialismus worked out any system-
specific arrangement for money and finance. The list 
includes, beside Heimann (1922 and 1934) who coined this 
term, Taylor (1928), Landauer (1931), Dickinson (1933), 
Lange (1938; for a comprehensive survey of pre-Har 
literature see Landauer, 1959). The same is true of more 
recent literature on socialist blueprints, except perhaps 
Brus' stress on the importance of money in the decentralised 
model of socialism (Brus 1964). Nave's "feasible socialism" 
(1984) only mentions money to say that it must be there and 
never mentions financial markets. In the latest volume on 
"Rethinking socialist economics" (Nolan and Paine, 1986) 
financial innovation only goes as far as a new State 
Investment Bank. The development of monetary and financial 
institutions in the "reformed" socialist economies has 
simply imitated without change a few capitalist 
institutio'ns. 
3. Recent developments in socialist economies 
Monetary and financial institutions perhaps are 
most developed in Yugoslavia where for a long time, 
especially since 1971, banking and credit have been major 
instruments of macroeconomic management; there are a 
plurality of commercial banks, investment banks and other 
financial institutions; enterprises can lend to or have a 
share in other enterprises or even found new banks, or sell 
bonds to the public including individuals (See Dimitrievic 
and Macesich, 1973, 1983). However, in Yugoslavia these 
developments may be due to its specific systemic features, 
since income-sharing by self-managed enterprises is expected 
to favour financial intermediation at·the expenses of direct 
reinvestment of enterprise income (self-financed assets, 
unlike distributed income, cannot be appropriated by 
workers; ·see for instance Pejovich 1976 and Furobotn 1980). 
Moreover, an enterprise in which another enterprise has a 
direct share investment can pay it back at historical cost, 
so that Hhat appears as equity is effectively a loan (see 
the Associated Labour Act, and Uvalic 1987). 
Leaving aside Yugoslavia, the most developed 
monetary and financial institutions can be found in Hungary, 
especially since the inauguration of the new banking system 
4 
on 1 January 1987. The National Banl<:: of Hungary has hived 
off its credit activities by transforming its lending 
directorates and some local branches into associated but 
separate banks, such as Innofinance (or General Financial 
Institution for Innovation) and a number of commercial 
banks: the Hungarian Credit Bank, the National Commercial 
and Credit Bank, the Credit Bank of Budapest (Budapesti 
Itelbank). These and other commercial banks are or soon 
will be operating, including the Hungarian Foreign Trade 
Bank, the General Banking and Trust Company, and three banks 
with substantial foreign participation (the older Central-
European International Bank and the Citibank Budapest as 
well as the new 45 per cent foreign owned Unicbank). There 
is an obligatory reserve ratio of 20 percent for demand 
deposits and 10 percent of time deposits; "to avoid multiple 
creation of outstanding reserves, deposits taken over from 
other financial institutions are exempt from the obligatory 
reserve requirement'' (NBH, 1986); the discount rate, which 
until the end of 1984 was decided by the government, is now 
decided by the President of the Central Bank. 
Bonds were first issued experimentally in Hungary 
in October 1981 for local authorities and are now regulated 
by a decree of the Minister of Finance of 1984, n. 28: 
government, local authorities, financial institutions and 
ent.erprises (state, cooperative and joint) can issne bonds 
subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance. The 
State Development Bank is playing a major role in financial 
intermediation and operates a primary and secondary market 
for bonds issued by public utilities and other state 
enterprises. 
There are two types of Hungarian bonds, 
respectively for sale to the population or to state 
agencies; the first are guaranteed by t.he state (which 
defeats one of the purposes of financial intermediation, 
i.e. the discrimination between different classes of 
borrowers with respect to risk) and are tax-free, the second 
are not guaranteed and are taxed. The State Development 
Bank does about one half of the underwriting; prospectuses 
are available to investors and advertised; bonds for the 
population are sold for cash over the counter, have bearer 
form; they can be retraded, most of them are listed daily by 
the State Development Bank to whom they can be sold back. 
Dealings take place in a trading room in the Budapest 
headquarters of the State Development Bank, but there are 
facilities also in the provinces. The range of maturities 
at issue is 1-15 years, with yields of 7-15 per cent, and an 
average of 11 per cent on an average maturity of 7 years. 
There has been at least one case of performance-linl<:ed bond, 
with interest of 9 per cent increasing to 13 pe~ cent 
subject to the borrower's profit performance. These bonds 
are traded at various premia or discounts with respect to 
the price of issue; average yield is presently 10-10.8 per 
cent, compared with an interest rate of 11 per cent paid by 
enterprises and of 9 per cent paid on time deposits of 
comparable length. The typical investor (accounting for 80 
per cent of investment) is 50-60 years old. Bonds represent 
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under 1 per cent of the population stock of savings; yearly 
turnover is about half the stock of bonds. 
After Hungary, the socialist economy most advanced 
in its monetary and financial reform is perhaps China, where 
commercial banking has developed and the first experiments 
with financial markets are taking place (See Naughton, 
1986). Most of the enterprises issuing shares are 
collectives or private enterprises whose employees buy the 
stock but a few state enterprises are also experimenting 
with stock; joint stock companies are regarded as a mixture 
of the other three forms of ownership (state, private, 
collective; see Sensenbrenner, 1987). A first stock 
exchange is reported to have been opened on 1 September 1986 
in Shanghai and the official press has published regulations 
for bond and share trading in the southern province of 
Guangdong, where more than 1,000 companies have issued such 
securities; according to the official Economic Daily "Buyers 
of shares will be the working public" (Financial Times, 15 
October 1986). However this is still no more than a small 
scale local ~xperiment and in any case shares are still 
illiquid (having to be held for substantial minimum periods) 
and do not carry a vote; it is significant that the Shanghai 
stock exchange had to be closed for weeks after its opening 
because all the bonds and shares had been "sold out" 
(Handelsblatt, 27 November 1986), while if that market had 
been functioning properly oversubscription should have led 
to intensive retracting. 
The Polish reform project of 1981, which is still 
the offic\al blueprint endorsed by the Party Congresses in 
1981 and 1986, envisaged the creation of new, specialised 
and fully independent credit institutions, with enterprises 
entering contractual relations with any one bank of their 
choosing while the Central Bank would acquire a new major 
role as institution of refinancing for other banks (KPZdsRG, 
1981). Implementation to date in principle does away with 
automatic credit and relies on contractual relations between 
bank and enterprises, but the National Bank of Poland still 
combines central and commercial banking functions and has 
virtual monopoly of credit, in spite of the birth (again on 
the fated date of 1 January 1987) of an Export Development 
Bank for the state sector. Legislation on state enterprises 
(September 1981) simply refers to "the bank". However 
recently the chief Polish government spokesman, Mr ,Jerzy 
Urban, is reported to have announced that Poland will soon 
offer shares to private citizens in several state companies: 
"plans to start a classic stock market like London's have 
not been included in existing projects, but if there is a 
demand for it and if it proves necessary or suitable for the 
good of the Polish economy, we would not refrain from it" 
(Urban was· lecturing at the Swedish Foreign Policy Institute 
in Stockholm on 6 April 1987; Financial Times, 7 April 
1D87). 
Recently it has been announced that Bulgaria is to 
follow the Hungarian monetary and financial reform by mid-
1987 (Financial Times, 10 February 1987, and East European 
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Markets, 20 February 1987). If Gorbachev's economic reform 
got off the ground in the Soviet Union similar monetary and 
financial changes would have to be introduced but so far 
there have only been unofficial intimations of such a 
possibility (for instance in an interview with Leonid 
Aballdn in East European Markets, 20 February 1887, Hhere 
specific reference to the Hungarian and Bulgarian model is 
made, and in an interview with Abel Aganbegyan on Italian TV 
on 15 March 1987; see also Petrakov, 1987, who specjfically 
indicates the replacement of automatic credit with 
enterprise creditworthiness, a time structure of interest 
rates, profit-oriented and competing "special purpose" 
banks, though still subject to the "leading r.ole" of 
Gosbank). 
4. 
exchange 
Restrictions on equity ownership, control and 
The introduction of monetary and financial 
institutions, instruments and markets in the socialist model 
so far has not developed anything new, or system-specific. 
Well tried capitalist practices simply have been grafted 
onto the socialist model, only on a. smaller scale and 
subject to three important systemic limitations nature: i) 
the exclusion of national individual ownership of equity 
stakes in state enterprises, with the possible exception of 
China; ii) in any case, the even stricter lack of provisions 
for shareholders' voting rights to influence managerial 
appointments, dismissals and policies; iii) the lack of a 
developed secondary market even for the equity shares owned 
by state agencies. 
It might be argued that these three restrictions 
on individual ownership, voting and secondary exchange do 
not derive from the system's economic features but are 
purely ideological. From a purely economic vieHpoint the 
big divides are i) whether or not individuals are allowed to 
save (as Joan Robinson used to say, the reward of abstinence 
is first of all the ability to keep what one abstains from 
consuming); ii) the payment of an interest on savings; iii) 
the opportunity to take risk and the reward or loss 
associated with it; and iv) whether or not private 
individuals or agencies are allowed to own means of 
production and hire labour. All extant models of socialist 
economy encourage individual savings, pay more than symbolic 
interest, hold lotteries and pay profit-linked premia; Hhile 
private enterprises - including joint enterprises also with 
foreign capital and even with a majority interest are 
allowed in many socialist economies, such as Hungary and 
Poland. Once these systemic limits are overstepped, 
restrictions on individual ownership and control and the 
lack of secondary retracting of equities appear to be rooted 
in the ideological rather than economic principles of the 
socialist system. Nevertheless, regardless of their causes 
these restrictions are an integral part of "realised 
socialism" everywhere; they are hardly dented by the Chinese 
experiment and given the lack of current plans for further 
financial reform and the usual implementation lags they can 
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be expected to continue to apply for quite a while in the 
foreseeable future. 
The rest of this paper considers: i) the 
implications of these three restrictions on equity 
ownership, control and exchange for the efficiency of market 
socialism and ii) the possibility of performing or 
simulating, in that model, the functions which in a 
capitalist economy are performed, or at any rate should be 
performed, by capital markets with unrestricted ownership, 
control and trade of equity shares. 
5. 
markets 
Financial intermediation and secondary equity 
It is useful to distinguish between the functions 
of direct (i.e. primary) financial intermediation and of 
secondary trading in securities (which is thin or partly 
missing for shares under market socialism). 
Financial intermediaries basically match lenders 
and borrowers, the short and long term ends of the market, 
and pool or share risks. The issue of new bonds and shares 
pertains to these functions and can be performed regardless 
of the existence of a stock exchange as a secondary market, 
though of course the anticipation of after-issue prices in 
such a market when it exists is an important determinant of 
issue prices. In the absence of secondary retracting, 
financial intermediation would consist exclusively of the 
issue of'· new bonds and shares which, as Keynes once 
advocated out of concern for speculatory instability and the 
liquidity trap, would be tied to their purchasers. in _an 
indissoluble marriage-like contract. Flnanclal 
intermediation could still be performed, but with two major 
disabilities. First, over time on average the resulting. 
illiquidity of financial assets would make them less 
attractive to potential lenders/investors so that 
intermediation would take p.lace presumably on a smaller 
scale and at a higher cost to borrowers/issuers i.e. less 
efficiently than if a secondary market was allowed. 
Second, speculatory instability would be replaced by yields 
instability in a thinner market where old stocks are not 
substitutes for new issues. Borrowing on the security of 
non transferable bonds and shares, or small scale retrading 
as in the case of unlisted securities, reduces but does not 
eliminate completely these disabilities and the ensueing 
inefficiency. 
Thus the first function of secondary markets is 
that of continuously "liquidising" both bonds and the real 
assets embodied in shares, which would otherwise remain 
illiquid, introducing the possibility of divorcing investors 
from their long term investment. This represents a 
considerable financial inducement to save and to place 
savings in bonds and shares rather than inventories and 
cash, which would be otherwise a more liquid alternative in 
spite of their actual (storage) or opportunity (forsaken 
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interest) cost. This is an important function in present 
day socialist economies, reported to be in a semi-permanent 
state of excess demand (Kornai, 1980; see also Nuti, 1986), 
not only for individuals if shares were to be made available 
to them, but for enterprises which could be cured at least 
partly of their hoarding habits and of their "soft budget" 
syndrome (diagnosed by Kornai, 1980, eh. 13). An enterprise 
with access to liquid investment in other enterprises, in 
fact, would find hoarding of both materials and cash more 
costly than without such an access. 
The second function of secondary markets for 
shares and bonds is that of providing a current valuation of 
enterprise financial liabilities and above all a valuation 
of sort of any listed company as a going concern, i.e. a 
current valuation of enterprises' net physical and financial 
assets in their current use and under the existing 
management and the actual policies pursued; together with 
the dividend record of a company, this valuation and its 
trend give an indication of past performance and prospects. 
A corollary, which could be viewed as a separate function, 
is that of bringing the current valuation of an enterprise 
as a going concern close to the maximum value, net of 
liabilities, that the enterprise productive assets could 
have if redeployed elsewhere in the economy or employed in 
the same activity under a different management and/or 
policy. If this were not the case an incentive would appear 
for another company or group to acquire a controlling 
interest and gain from a change of management and/or policy 
or even , the liquidation of the company taken over, 
regardless of the wishes of the existing management. This 
function, which the stock exchange in capitalist economies 
often does not perform sufficiently or performs only too 
well (as witnessed by factory closures, asset stripping and 
insider trading as well as turbulence in financial markets) 
is very important for bringing managerial capitalism 
somewhat closer to the traditional capi t.alist model in spite 
of the separation of ownership and control (Marris, 1964; 
see however the reservations expressed by Stiglitz, 1985). 
There can be no doubt that these 
whether or not they are well performed - if at 
capitalist economy, are extremely important in 
socialist" economy where production and 
decentralised to enterprises and "monetisation" 
introduced successfully. 
functions, 
all - in a 
a "market 
trade are 
has been 
A continuous evaluation of assets is needed to 
assess past performance by adding to (deducting from) 
current distributed profits the increase (decrease) in the 
value of capital assets used by enterprises; this is 
preferable to arbitrary and debatable (especially if there 
is inflation) accounting conventions for the determination 
of an appropriate capital amortisation allowance to be 
subtracted from gross profits. Such valuation is also 
necessary in order to assess the prospective profitability 
of enterprise activity, as opposed to profitability 
calculated on the historical cost (even if properly 
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corrected for amortisation) of the enterprise's capital 
assets; if prospective profitability as a ratio over the 
currant value of assets is lower than interest rates 
applicable over the period there is a case for considering 
the enterprise liquidation and redeployment of assets even 
if prospective profits are sufficiently high with respect to 
the historical cost of the enterprise's capital assets. 
These functions are particularly important at times when a 
productive structure that has become inappropriate to 
current conditions is being "restructured", in order to 
indicate the desirability of continued operation versus 
redeployment and to put all enterprises on an equal footing 
when performance indicators are used to determine managerial 
and staff bonuses, profit retentions and credit-worthiness. 
Polish planners, for instance, have expressed a 
preoccupation for giving all enterprises "equal chances" 
with the introduction of economic reform, whereas historical 
valuations of enterprise assets normally are a biassed basis 
for calculating profitability as an indicator of current and 
prospective performance, except in the unlikely case of ex-
post profit rates happening to be uniform and equal to their 
planned levels throughout the economy. 
Suppose an enterprise expects to be able to use 
the assets of another more productively if it could take 
them over and use them in a different sector or simply 
change its policies or pursue the same policies with greater 
efficiency. S~ppose also that the first enterprise has the 
financial means to acquire the second, or it can persuade 
other enterprises or credit institutions to lend the means 
to acquire it. The ability of the first enterprise to take 
over the second simply descends from competitive 
entrepreneurship· and not from capitalism as a system of 
ownership; once state enterprises are transformed as 
reform projects state to be the intent - from administrative 
agencies into competing profit-minded and decentralised 
agencies, it makes no sense to give them a de facto monopoly 
in the use of the productive assets which they happen to 
possess. That monopoly is already broken when a loss-making 
enterprise is liquidated or bankrupted (for instance in 
current Polish legislation), as in that case its assets and 
liabilities can be taken over by another enterprise or be 
dispersed among a number of enterprises. At present, 
however, managers of state enterprises - both in capitalist 
and socialist systems are protected from "unfriendly" 
tal~eovers by groups acquiring a controlling share interest. 
Yet without this potential threat managers can afford to be 
inefficient and monopolistic and there is no competitive 
mechanism which might redeploy efficiently existing assets, 
in view of the rarity and at any rate the imperfection of 
markets for used productive assets. 
The question is therefore how can these functions 
be performed in economies which, rightly or wrongly, do not 
allow individual shareholders to have a vote or possibly 
even to exist and which do not, in any case, wish to 
recreate the large scale logistic ·apparatus of a stock 
exchange. 
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6. Existing instruments and institutions 
The valuation of capital assets could be 
undertaken as a centralised task or as a market service 
within the framework of the respective model. We could 
imagine a State Committee of Experts for the Current 
Valuation of Capital, enlisting accountants, economists and 
engineers, sitting in the capital city and issuing an 
official valuation of all plants, buildings and land in the 
whole country, officially applicable from l ,T<J.nuary in the 
base year, revised periodically or on request. Information 
costs and "moral hazard" make this impracticable; we can 
presume that if central planning were capable of performing 
this kind of task, moreover speedily and accurately, it 
would not need reforming, since the information required for 
such task is the same as that required for the efficient 
management of the planned economy, i.e. data about current 
and future resource allocation and prices. 
Alternatively, we could 
brokerage agency (as suggested by 
fee, would seek better uses for 
and locate redundant equipment to 
an agency, or a number of them 
would be limited to consensual 
assets, and would not perform 
enterprise management. 
imagine a private or state 
Manuel Hinds) which, for a 
existing capital equipment 
fill existing needs. Such 
in competition, however, 
red8ployment of existing 
any disciplinary role on 
Starting from a Hungarian-type environment, i.e. 
public shareholders and commercial banking competition, 
perhaps the most promising development which could be 
imitated from Western experience is that of German-type 
banking involvement in the management of enterprises. The 
special feature considered here is not the mixed nature of 
German banks, operating both at the short and long end of 
the marh:et, but their intimate involvement in the management. 
of industrial companies: through the appointment of 
representatives to the Boards of borrowing firms, through 
direct shareholding (found to be 9 per cent of shar~ capital 
in a study of 74 representative quoted companies, Eckstein, 
1980) and above all through proxy voting on behalf of those 
shareholders (by and large the majority) who have lodged 
their shares with their banks (see for instance Cable, 1985a 
and 1985b). This institutional pattern was introduced as a 
consequence of the underdevelopment of capital markets in 
late nineteenth century Germany and is nat.urally suited to 
the rudimentary capital market of a country like Hungary. 
Public shareholders, possibly also private shareholders 
without voting rights, could entrust competing commercial 
banl>::s with the tasl>;: of overviewing their companies and 
monitoring and promoting their profitability. 
However, the merits of German-type supervision of 
industry by banks are controversial and the system has come 
under strong criticism recently, especially in Germany 
(Gessler Kommission 1979; Eckstein 1983; Vittas 1983). The 
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system is widely regarded as a second-best option; the 
dominating role of banks in the stock exchange is resented, 
especially in view of conflicting interests vested in 
different functions of banks as lenders, shareholders and 
advisors to investors, their emphasis on short term 
performance and the dangers of monopolistic practices (which 
have attracted the attention of the Monopolko~nission, see 
Cable, 1985a). It is no accident that German bank 
legislation explicitly prohibits any transmission of inside 
information by bank representatives on company boards to 
their own bank or primary employer, or to any other party 
(Articles 93 and 116 of the Aktiengesetz; article 404 treats 
any break of confidentiality by bank representatives as 
liable to prosecution as criminal offence; I am grateful to 
Felix FitzRoy for drawing my attention to these norms and 
for providing the next references quoted below from an 
unpublished paper by FitzRoy and Kornelius Kraft). Werner 
(1981) suggests that bank officials are well aware of their 
sensitive position and comply with these prescriptions; 
Lutter (1981) emphasises that bank appointees on company 
boards are subject to the mandate to exclusively promote the 
interests of the company supervised. Thus the kind of board 
behaviour that is supposed to give banks direct control over 
their borrowers is actually illegal; control must rely on 
banks' shareholding and proxy-voting. (Fitzroy and Kraft 
point out that the main role of bank representatives in the 
supervisory board, or Aufsichtsrat, is to approve annual 
financial · statements and to appoint · members of the 
management board (Vorstand); only at times of crisis such as 
the rece:O.t near-collapse of AEG is there any direct 
involvement by bank representative, while a strong bank 
presence in the Aufsichtsrat of AEG did not help reveal the 
build-up of the crisis until it was almost too late). 
Moreover the German system generates a certain insulation 
between the real world of production and the world of 
financial values, which prevents the fulfilment of the 
function discussed above, of stimulating efficient 
redeployment of assets. For these reasons, and as an end in 
itself, let us explore further the range of permissible 
financial institutiona under market socialism. 
What follows is an intellectual experiment 
understood as an exercise in consistency between the 
premises and existing models of market socialism, not a 
stat.ement about the relative merits of market,s versus plans, 
private versus state ownership, or of alternative models of 
socialism. 
7. Feasible innovation. Stage One: capital evaluation 
and inter-firm mobility 
Imagine a successfully reformed and remonetised 
socialist economy where enterprises are engaged in 
production and trade through contractual relations with 
other state agencies, while planning is confined to 
macroeconomic policies and truly parametric (i.e. non 
enterprise-specific) instruments for the central 
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manipulation of market signals. Sectoral policies can be 
undertaken by the government but sector-specific subsidy or 
tax differentials must be applied by the government 
consistentJ.y and predictably. Suppose the following steps 
are implemented: 
i) Enterprise managers are asked to assess the 
current value of their productive assets, as a whole and for 
specific components (such as individual plants) exceeding a 
certain ceiling, and to register it with a central public 
record office; if managers do not provide such a valuation 
by a given date the central record office automatically 
enters the book value of enterprise assets. (Yearly book 
values are already publicly available in Poland for the top 
500 manufacturing enterprises and the top 300 state farms). 
ii) At any time subsequently any other state 
enterprise can bid for the enterprise's productive assets, 
as a whole or for a specifically listed plant or other large 
item. vfuen this happens either the challenged enterprise 
revises upwards the valuation of its assets to the point 
that the request to purchase is withdrawn, or has to sell at 
the highest valuation offered. If the bid is for a section 
of the enterprise assets the enterprise can link it to other 
sections but has to prove that there is a technological 
connection between the two sections. If there is a sale, 
sale revenue is first used to satisfy creditors; any 
remainder is retained by the enterprise unless it has sold 
its entire assets in which case any net residual value is 
transferred to the enterprise's shareholders (in their 
absence Branch Ministries, defined as "founders" in Polish 
law, could take this role). 
iii) At any time the enterprise can alter its 
capital valuation registered with the public records office, 
raising it as new capacity comes on stream or as the 
profitability of its products increases, or lowering it in 
consideration of wear and tear, obsolescence, or falls in 
the profitability of its products. 
iv) Any increase in the valuation of the 
enterprise's productive assets recorded spontaneously by the 
enterprise, or as a result of a bid for its assets (whether 
failed or successful) in any fiscal year, net of any change 
in its financial assets and liabilities, is regarded as part 
of net pr'ofi t (and any fall as a loss) to be added to (or 
deducted from) the enterprise distributed profits. (Any 
deduction for amortisation becomes a purely internal 
reallocation of funds in compliance with accounting 
conventions but no deduction for amortisation is needed to 
calculate net profit once the change in the current value of 
enterprise assets has been estimated and added to dividends; 
whether profits distributed to workers should or should not 
be included in this notion of profit depends on whether the 
workers' profit share is or is not regarded as part of 
workers' basic income). 
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v) Unsuccessful bidders are paid by the enterprise 
a small commission on their raise over the last previous bid 
(or over the initial value for the first bidder). 
vi) A tax is charged on any increase in the value 
of the enterprise's net assets due exclusively to a 
revaluation of existing assets, at a tax rate higher than 
the tax on operating profit. Alternatively, or at the same 
time, any profit-rate-linked bonus for managers and staff is 
calculated at a lower rate for that part of the enterprise 
profit which is due to the revaluation of existing assets. 
Enterprise managers have an incentive to 
understate the value of their assets in order to avoid 
paying tax on capital gains or in order to obtain in the 
future higher profit-rate-linked bonuses; but a limit. to 
their wish to understate is set by the positive though 
weaker impact of capital gains on current bonuses and, above 
all, by the danger of encouranging other enterprises to 
consider taking them over. The two opposite incentives do 
not necessarily cancel out inducing managers to reveal their 
true assessment of capital values, but their deliberate 
distortions will be contained within a range which can be 
narrowed by manipulating bonuses and tax parameters. 
The arrangements outlined under Stage One have the 
advantage of providing i) a continuous, non-bureaucratic, 
·decentralised and automatic evaluation of enterprise 
capital, necessary to assess past performance and guide 
current allocation; ii) a mechanism for inter-sectoral and 
inter-firm mobility of physical capital, necessary to ensure 
its efficient use; iii) an incentive for enterprises to use 
their capital equipment in the way that maximises their 
valuation and a disincentive to invest in ventures which 
might reduce the net value of their assets. Thus some of the 
tasks usually expected of a capital market are performed 
here without a bureaucracy and with a minimum of financial 
innovation without touching at all the systemic constraints 
of "realised socialism". 
Stage One has an apparent similarity with a 
proposal by the Hungarian economist Tibor Liska (as Georg 
Suranyi pointed out to me; see Liska 1963, 1986a and 1986b; 
see also MacRae 1983 and Barsony 1982). In Liska's 
"entrepreneurial socialism", however, individuals use t,he 
guaranteed income out of their share of social capital to 
bid for the rental of production goods, renting them if 
successful or encashing from successful bidders the amount 
of their unsuccessful raises, surrendering at death their 
original capital stake and its accretion. Here state and 
private enterprises bid for the purchase of larger chunks of 
productive assets, if unsuccessful keeping nothing or at 
most a small percentage on their raises. The differences 
between the two schemes are substantial; ultimately they 
only have in common the permanent state of insecurity of 
enterprise managers, c·::;ntinuously exposed to the challenge 
of potentially better users of their enterprise's assets. 
Kornai criticises Liska for exposing managers to this kind 
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of insecurity (Kornai, 1982) but no competitive behaviour 
and profit-mindedness and therefore no hardening of 
Kornai's alleged "soft-budget constraints" (Kornai, 1980, 
vol.I, Ch. 13) can be expected of managers without 
introducing precisely this kind of insecurity. 
A limitation of Stage One is that it forces 
managers to utilise their assets as profitably as they could 
be used in their best alternative use outside their firm.and 
not up to the maximum profitability that could be obtalned 
in the firm, and which only they are likely to know. ~ta~e 
One can, at most, bring the valuation of an enterprlse s 
capital up to its maximum value obtainable outside the 
enterprise. If enterprise capital is not easily 
redeployable elsewhere, i.e. if it is highly specific or 
immovable, the possibility remains of its management using 
it inefficiently undisturbed or exploiting monopolistic 
power. The same snag would apply to Liska's proposals. 
Stage Two is designed to overcome these difficulties 
introducing voting shares but maintaining the systemic 
constraints of excluding private individuals from share 
ownership and voting control and of avoiding a large-scale 
secondary market. 
8. Stage Two: share capital evaluation, exchange and 
control 
Stage Two is composed of 
preferably, but not necessarily taken 
completed: · 
the· following 
after Stage 
steps, 
One is 
i) State enterprises are requested to declare and 
record in a public register the current market value of 
their physical assets (hence the ·desirability of Stage One 
in order to ensure a realistic assessment of current.value), 
financial assets and liabilities (which could be audlted and 
evaluated at the time of the declaration, subject to the 
same external bidding in case of divergent views about 
interest rate trends), i.e. their estimated Net Worth. 
ii) The enterprise founders (Branch Ministries if 
there are no others) are then issued with a number of 
shares, each of a nominal value of, say, zlotys 100,000, 
with a total .capitalisation equal to the enterprise 
estimated Net Worth. 
iii) Thereafter the enterprise can, at any time on 
its own initiative, raise or lower the valua~ion of its Net 
Worth, thereby altering the current value of l~S shares .. In 
practice the enterprise simply a~nounces pub~1cl~ a revlsed 
value of its shares, without reference to lts founders as 
initial shareholders or to subsequent shareholders. 
iv) As long as they are shareholders, founders can 
ex officio raise or lower the valuation of the enterpri~e 
shares; however founders must sell the shares in thelr 
possession to any state agency (productive enterprises, 
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banks including the Central Bank and financial 
institutions, pension funds, insurance companies, etcetera) 
wishing to buy them at the price decreed by enterprises or 
revised by themselves. The shares so acquired by state 
agencies are managed by them as owners and not by their own 
founders; the government can repurchase those shares if they 
are offered for sale but it can only do this via the Central 
Bank or through a special State Holding Company, not through 
the original branch ministries as founders. In this way 
share transfers implement automatically a decentralisation 
process which progressively divests ownership and control 
away from central sectoral bodies, without however violating 
the principles of public ownership since the transfers do 
not involve the private sector or private individuals. 
Founders transfer the proceeds of their share sales to the 
state budget; government policy can affect share prices in 
such a way as to reduce or raise the liquidity of state 
enterprises, as happens in capitalist economies as a result 
of open market operations. 
v) State agencies wishing to purchase or to sell 
t.he shares of an enterprise at the price published by 
ent,erprises or revised by shareholding founders address 
their :request to the enterprise itself (hence the avoidance 
of a large-scale centralised market). If a net excess 
demand or supply of shares arises at those prices, if it is 
small relatively to turnover - say, 20 per cent - it is 
handled through proportional rationing (as in the case of 
oversubscribed issues of capitalist companies); if it is 
large relatively to turnover but small relatively to the 
total sto~k of the enterprise - say, 1-5 per cent - it is 
treated as a waiting list. Otherwise, alternative 
procedures are followed for excess demand or supply. 
vi) If, once the enterprise founders hold no more 
shares, a net excess demand appears, the enterprise must 
either accept the surplus bids and issue additional shares 
at the published price, or raise the valuation of its shares 
upwards by small predetermined discrete steps until the 
excess demand disappears (if at some point excess demand 
turns into excess supply the previous price last quoted is 
regarded as an equilibrium price though bidders are 
rationed, regardless of the size of the latest excess demand 
relatively to either turnover or total stook). 
vii) If at the self-assessed share prices of an 
enterprise there is a net excess supply of shares, beyond 
the tolerance limits indicated above, the enterprise may 
choose to reimburse the excess shares at that price but is 
highly unlikely to do so unless it is particularly liquid 
and the management is far more confident of the enterprise 
profit prospects than existing shareholders. Alternatively 
the enterprise can and, more probably, will lower the 
valuation of its stook until the excess supply of its shares 
disappears or turns into a small excess demand, at which 
point as in the previous case bidders either are in 
equilibrium or are rationed at a price treated as the 
equilibrium price. 
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viii) Each share carries a voting right, exercised 
at yearly meetings of shareholders, or more frequently at 
special meetings if they are called by a substantial 
fraction of total shareholders. At those meetings the 
performance of existing managers is discussed, current 
policies and future plans can be revised and limits imposed 
on management; most important, profits are allocated to 
reinvestment or distribution to shareholders, and managers 
can be dismissed and appointed. I~ shares are sufficiently 
dispersed a controlling interest can be acquired with a 
fraction substantially lower than the majority of shares. 
The potential threat of hostile bidders taking over a 
controlling interest will exercise some restraining 
influence on managers otherwise tempted to stray from the 
straight and narrow development path of efficiency and 
concern for shareholders' interests. In general there can 
be no effective market or quasi-market for shares without 
the attachment of voting rights to shares, because otherwise 
there is no shareholders' protection against managerial 
inefficiency or simply lack of initiative or imagination; at 
a time of transition from centralised commands to 
decentralised enterprises the voting provision is even more 
necessary. 
ix) As in Stage One, the change in the market 
valuation of the enterprise is an element to be added to 
distributed profits for· the assessment of managerial 
performance. In Stage Two, however, the possibility of 
managers deliberately overstating the value of their assets 
is ruled 6ut by market discipline (i.e. by the appearance of 
excess supply of shares at artificially inflated asset 
values) so that there is no longer a need for a tougher tax 
treatment of the appreciation of enterprise assets. 
x) The operation of this kind of secondary market 
for shares is not only fragmented and decentralised to each 
enterprise, but is also intermittent to a greater extent 
than the capitalist stook exchange as we know it. The 
secondary market envisaged here is best thought of as 
opening and shutting once a day, or a week, or even a month, 
to handle the bids received since the previous closure. In 
order to iron out the effect of this type of discontinuity 
(qualitatively no different from the closure of capitalist 
stock markets outside opening hours and working days) it is 
best to conceive buying and selling bids not as single 
valued quantities at the previously announced price but as 
indications of alternative quantities bought or sold at 
alternative prices in the neighbourhood of that price; or 
more simply as indications of reserve prices below or ahove 
which the bid is revoked. 
The combined outcome of all these a.rrangement.s is 
a kind of slow motion stock market, however with all the 
features necessary for its vitality, namely competitive 
bidding, negligible indivisibilities, and restraint of 
managerial discretion. Stage Two can be introduced 
gradually; it does not violate the principles of public 
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ownership; it dissolves the sectoral centralisation built 
into branch ministries thus preparing the ground for their 
abolition, but it preserves instruments of central 
government policy both macroeconomic (through open market 
operations of the Central Bank) and sectoral (through the 
activities of a new State Holdings Company). In principle, 
it cannot be said to be potentially better nor worse than 
the capitalist stock exchange as we l~:now it, except for the 
exclusion of private individuals. This matters not only 
because of individual exclusion from a range of enrichment 
opportunities, which is bound to have a discouraging effect 
on personal savings, but because the exclusion mal~:es the 
secondary market described unresponsive to information, 
beliefs and expectations diffused throughout society at 
large. The additional provisions introduced in Stage Three 
are designed to remove this limitation. 
9. Stage Three: individual indirect participation 
without either ownership or control 
The exclusion of private individuals from direct 
ownership of shares in productive and financial state 
enterprfses (therefore including investment trusts, common 
fu.nds, etc. ) is not an insurmountable obstacle to individual 
participation in either risk-bearing or control. Risk-
bearing without ownership is already present in capitalist 
financial markets through options trading as well as "bets" 
on the movements of major financial indices; with 
appropriate modifications these institutions could be 
grafted onto market socialism. One could also add a new 
institution, namely the indexation of deposits and loans to 
the cumulative performance of a share inclusive of the 
1·einvestment of dividends, which would produce t.he same 
results without the leverage effect and therefore 
speculative dangers of options and "bets". The idea is that 
one or more state agencies should buy and sell options, take 
bets, make loans or take deposits, at prices/odds/rates such 
that individuals could gain from spotting above average and 
below average performing enterprises or lose from their 
failure to do so, if they wish and on the scale they wish to 
expose themselves to risk. If, in addition, a mechanism was 
introduced to ensure that individual "investment" choices 
had an impact on share prices individuals would be 
exercising, indirectly, some influence both on managers 
(threatened by takeover if policies unwanted by the public 
depress share prices) and on· investment allocation (since 
enterprises popular with the public will register higher 
share prices thus facilitating their capital raising through 
share issues). Let us consider first the three alternative 
modes of risk-sharing without own'ership and the pricing 
formulas associated with each of them, then the question of 
indirect control. 
sell 
price 
option 
(i) An option is the right to buy (call option) or 
(put option) shares (or anything else) at a specific 
(the striking price) before a specific date when the 
expires. Normally, however,· when an option is 
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exercised by its buyer/owner it leads to a payment by its 
seller of an amount corresponding to the difference between 
the striking and the spot price of the amount of shares 
involved, rather than to the actual purchase/sale of that 
amount of shares at the striking price (especially if a 
share purchase had to be followed by an actual sale for the 
realisation of profit from the operation). The option 
transactor thus incurs risk and is exposed to uncertain 
benefits or losses without acquiring ownership (See Cox and 
Rubinstein, 1985). 
It would not be enough, however, for a share 
option market to be open in a market-socialist (3conomy where 
Stage Two of financial innovation has been realised: options 
trading in capitalist markets is not purely speculative but 
has a major hedging role for share owners, so that non-
share-owning individuals would not be present in large 
numbers on that market. But suppose that a state agency, 
possibly the State Holding Company that actually oHns shares 
on behalf of the government, is given the statutory 
obligation of issuing or buying call or put options. Let us 
say that call options are traded for a striking share price 
equal to the current share price and are sold at a price 
equal to the market rate of interest which would mature over 
the period on the current value of the shares involved, 
while dividends - if any - paid before the option expires 
accrue to the buyer of the call o~tion. In this way the 
individual "investor" buying the option, in spite of having 
no access to the secondary market for shares, breaks even if 
the rate of return (including distributed and reinvested 
profits plus capital appreciation) is equal to the interest 
rate, gains exactly to the extent that the enterprise shares 
perform better, and conversely loses up to ·100 per cent of 
his investment if the enterprise shares perform worse than 
the going interest rate. Or, for example, let us say that 
the price of put options is set at the same level as for a 
call option but the striking price is made equal to the 
current value of shares plus twice the market rate of 
interest over the period. Here the option buyer will lose 
up to 100 per cent of his investment, if the selected 
enterprise performs better than normal, but will gain to the 
full extent that the enterprise performs worse than the 
market rate of interest. (Discipline of individual 
transactors might require that any option price paid by the 
State Holding Company for options sold by the publjc should 
be deposited in a special account as a guarantee to cover 
the investor's possible losses). Thus, from the point of 
view of individuals, access to options trade is as good as 
access to share trade and ownership. 
(ii) An alternative or additional provision 
enabling non-owner individuals to participate in stock 
values gains and losses is the ability to bet fixed amounts 
of money on a share, or an index of share prices, moving in 
a specified (upwards or downwards) direction within a 
prearranged time. In the simplest version of this game the 
stake would be either lost or doubled, according to whether 
or not the share or the index move in the predicted 
19 
direction; more interestingly losses and gains could be made 
proportionate to actual price change. For instance, 
somebody betting 1000 forints that a given share will rise 
would lose his stake if the share does not move (within 
small bounds), gain 1000 forints for every percentage point 
increase or lose 1000 forints for every percentage point 
fall, registered (outside the same small bounds) at the time 
the position is closed by the betting individual within the 
stipulated time. This type of opportunity is available to 
investors in capitalist economies, and is indeed favoured 
because of tax treatment being more lenient for betting wins 
than for capital gains on share trading; for instance, one 
can bet on the FT index of London shares prices, or on the 
rate of exchange between dollar and sterling. The extension 
of this facility to enterprise shares would, as in the case 
of options trading, give individuals the opportunity to 
benefit fully from their ability to predict moves in share 
prices in spite of their lack of access to share trading. 
(iii) The only disadvantage of options and bets on 
enterprise shares, from the viewpoint of the socialist 
economy, might be the leverage involved in both 
institutions which enables individuals to notionally move 
masses of shares at a fraction of their market value; in 
order to discourage the speculative implications of options 
trade, which very often rightly or wrongly come under strong 
criticism also in capitalist economies, it might be 
necessary to stipulate that individual traders should, 
simultaneously with their options transaction, deposit with 
the Central Bank or with a specialised bank an amount 
corresponding to the total value of the shares on which they 
are trading options. The combination of compulsory deposits 
with either options trading or share bets, however, is 
equivalent to lending and borrowing operations indexed to 
the price of shares, with reinvested dividends computed into 
the index. If, as is likely in socialist economies, 
speculative opportunities are not encouraged, this type of 
indexation is the simplest financial innovation necessary to 
expose individuals to the effects of a stock exchange in 
which they are not allowed to trade shares. Taking a loan 
indexed to the price of a share and depositing the amount at 
the normal rate of return; or betting that the share price 
will fall; purchasing a put option or selling a call option, 
are all equivalent strategies - given the pricing criteria 
selected above for these alternatives for individuals 
believing that the share of a particular enterprise will 
perform below the going rate of return. Conversely, a 
deposit indexed to the price of a share, a bet that its 
price will increase, the purchase of a call option or the 
sale of a put option, again at the pricing criteria 
illustrated above are equivalent strategies for 
individuals convinced of the above average performance 
prospects of a particular enterprise share. 
All three systems, 
presume the existence of one 
agencies respectively issuing 
bets, or tpking or making 
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which could even coexist, 
or more specialised state 
or buying options, or taking 
loans indexed to share 
performance. If these agencies acted passively they would 
only undertake those transactions requested by individuals 
and suffer or gain from the accidents of th~ aggregate good 
or bad judgement of individual investors; the obstacle of no 
individual ownership of shares would be overcome but 
individuals would have no influence on share market values. 
The share trade of state agencies would be totally insulated 
from individual beliefs, information and preferences. This 
confirms that the envisaged financial innovation is 
compatible with total retention of state control - through 
state enterprises and specialised agencies over the 
economy; at the same time, if the public at large disagreed 
with the government about the relative merits of specific 
sectors and enterprises, and the public was right, as long 
as compensatory subsidies and tax changes were prevented the 
government would be specifically penalised - through the net 
losses of its agencies transacting options, bets or indexed 
loans with individuals for having disregarded the 
indications coming from the households sector. What is 
more, the government would be penalised precisely in 
proportion to the intensity of disagreement between its 
agencies and the public, measured by the volume of 
transactions in share options, bets on share price trends 
and loans indexed to enterprise performance. Therefore even 
a passive position on the part of the state agencies 
transacting with the public would produce information, 
penalties and rewards and therefore an incentive to respond 
to the public's convictions. 
At the other extreme of possible responses, the 
new speci~lised agencies could respond instantly and fully 
to the individuals' choices as investors, offsetting their 
net exposure in transactions with individuals through 
balancing purchases and sales of shares, which they unlike 
individuals are allowed to undertake. In this way the 
specialised agencies would make neither profits nor losses 
from share· movements, covering their running costs on 
average out of commissions on their transactions, but would 
transmit speedily and fully to the exclusively public trade 
of shares the wishes, beliefs and convicitons of the public 
at large. 
10. Summary and conclusions 
The recurring attempts at reforming central 
planning in socialist countries have been accompanied b~ 
measures of remonetisation of their economies. Thjs process 
has gone furthest in Hungary, with the separation of 
commercial from central banking functions of the National 
Bank, the establishment of competition in commercial 
banking, primary and secondary trading in bonds issued by 
state agencies and enterprises and available to the public, 
equity shares tradable between state agencies. Ffowever, the 
development of financial institutions has found everywhere, 
in practice, three systemic constraints, namely the lack of 
private ownership of equity shares (or, in any case, of 
voting rights associated to them) and the inadmissibility of 
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a large scale secondary market for the retrading of equity 
shares. This paper considers the implications of these 
constraints for the efficiency of market socialism and the 
possibility of producing the same effects with existing and 
with new instruments and institutions. 
Restricted ownership, control and retrading do not 
impede completely financial intermediation under market 
socialism: lenders and borrowers, short and long ends of the 
markets can still be matched and risks can be pooled or 
shared. The systemic constraints however prevent the 
exercise of three important functions of a stock exchange: 
the liquidity of investment in equity shares, the lack of 
which is a disincentive to save; the valuation of 
enterprises as going concerns, which is needed to assess 
past performance and to plan future allocation; the ensueing 
mechanism for redeployment of productive assets via mergers 
and takeovers, which in a capitalist economy does not even 
require the consensus of the managerial groups involved 
(e.g. in the case of hostile takeovers). 
These functions, which are important also for 
market socialism, conceivably could be performed by existing 
types of institutions: a centralised State Committee, which 
however would reproduce the drawbacks of central planning; a 
brokerage agency, which could only operate if there was 
consensus among different managerial groups; a German-type 
banking involvement in the management of firms (through 
mempership of boards, direct shareholding· and proxy-voting), 
which however is subject to criticisms for its internal 
conflict ~f interests and monopolistic tendencies. For 
these reasons, and for its own sake, the possibility is 
explored of alternative and innovatory financial instruments 
and institutions. 
A three stage scheme has been outlined above. In 
Stage 'one state and private enterprises are allowed to bid 
up the valuation of existing productive assets a 
challenged enterprise having to either release or revalue 
its assets thus ensuring the potential mobility of 
resources towards their most productive uses outside the 
enterprises that possess them. Tax and bonus provisions 
would encourage truthful reporting of asset values; 
i.ndivisibilities are dealt with by introducing joint bidding 
for technically joint productive assets. 
In Stage Two an intermittent stock exchange is 
suggested, decentralised to individual enterprises and with 
share ownership reserved to state agencies, also on the 
basis of the "challengeable self-assessment" principle. The 
valuation of underlying assets and liabilities, associated 
with Stage One, provides a practical underpinning of market 
valuation of shares but Stage Two could also function on its 
own, with enterprises and institutional investors (insurance 
companies, pension funds) as shareholders. 
from 
In 
there 
Stage Three 
ability to 
individuals are allowed to benefit 
identify above or below average 
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performing enterprises in spite of being excluded from 
ownership and control. This is done by means of loans 
(equivalent to a bear stance) and deposits (equivalent to a 
bull stance) indexed to the cumulative performance of any 
enterprise share, on any scale; it could also be done by a 
system of options and/or bets, though these would have the 
disadvantage of speculative leverage. Stage Three is 
compatible with any degree of government interference with 
the economy, as long as this is consistent and predictable. 
Namely, the government could persue its own industrial 
policy regardless of the indications of individuals' 
positions in the market for options/bets/indexed loans - and 
be penalised if individuals are proved right in the 
aggregate - or transmit fully individual positions to the 
limited stock exchange of Stage Two, thereby simulating much 
more fully the operation of a conventional capital market. 
The simulation of a stock exchange in a "market 
socialist" economy of course would expose that economy not 
only to potential efficiency gains but also to potential 
drawbacks such as instability, unemployment 'of labour, 
insider trading and adverse distribution of income and 
wealth. If these illnesses appeared antidotes would have to 
be found. Apart from the insulation between individual 
behaviour and real allocation, potentially still open in 
Stage Three, other system-specific remedies could be 
suggested. For instance, if there is unemployment the 
pricing of assets and the principles of bidding could be 
altered, any unused asset being compulsbrily released by 
enterprises to whoever can prqvide the highest employment at 
whatever ~rice is offered, unless the enterprise possessing 
the asset undertakes to match the additional employment 
offered. Workers' self-management organs could be given or 
tal:::e a lead in the proper valuation of assets (i.e. stamp on 
insider trading by diffusing relevant information) and in 
their redeployment. Undesirable distribution effects could 
be handled by means of taxation. 
If the scheme proposed here is deemed unworkable 
or unsuitable some other scheme will have to be devised. 
Once traditional central planning is replaced by competitive 
entrepreneurship it is necessary that monetary and financial 
institutions should also be altered to match. Unless 
socialist reformers intend to reproduce a capitalist economy 
without or with fewer capitalists it is imperative that they 
should invent and introduce financial innovations suitable 
to the systemic premises of their brand of market socialism. 
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